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Summary  findings
Domestic labor market outcomes influence the direction  accumulation of physical  and human capital and
and magnitude of the flow of international migration.  technical progress, a well-functioning  labor market is not
When wages are low and jobs are scarce, workers tend to  itself  a source of economic growth. Yet labor market
migrate to environments  where jobs are available  at  pathologies,  like macroecnnomic mismanagement,  can be
higher wages. But as labor demand grows, a labor-  extremely costly, severely  constraining growth of output
exporting counry  may become a net labor importer.  and employment and increasing inequality.
Such a 'migration transition" - already much in  Similarly,  failure to adequately  address the labor-
evidence in East and Southeast Asian  countries and  market aspects of policy reform can result in the failure
beginning for skilled  workers in India - is analogous  to  of other dimensions of reform.
the demographic transition. The process of political  The smooth functioning  of the labor market feeds on
economy described by Banerji, Campos, and Sabot  itself, enhancing the credibility  of both workers and the
affects the level and growth of wages and of formal  elite. Conversely, poor labor market performance can
sector employment.  So it is important for policymakers  also be self-reinforcing.  Attemnpts  to reform the labor
concerned about migration to high-income  countries to  market are likely  to be hampered by the lack of
take it into accounL  credibility of both labor and the elite.
An efficient, flexible, responsive  labor market  The payoff on labor reform can be high for both
contributes to growth by creating an appropriate  groups. The chalienge is to find mechanisms  whereby the
economic  environment. In this respect, labor policy is  credibility of both groups can be bolstered.
like macroeconomic  and trade policy. Unlike the
This paper - a product of the Office of the Vice President,  Development  Economics  - is a background  paper for World
Development  Report  199S  on labor. Versions  of the paper were presented  at a World Bank  seminar  and to the 1994 Northeast
Universities  Development  Conference  atYale  University.  Copies  of this paper are available  free  from the World Bank, 1818 H
Street  NW, Washington  DC, 20433. Please  contact  Danikle  Evans,  room N9-059, extension  37496 (41 pages).  March 1995.
The Poliy Pesamb Working  Paper  Seie  disates  the findns  of wor&  sn prog°8 t  enoage  the exchange  of ides abot
deeopment isss  An obvectiw  of  the  seris is  to  get the  findinsg  out  quikly, aev if the  petaunsre  less  thw  dfidly  polished.  The
paprs ca  the names  of the aubors  and  should  be used  and  cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  iterprion  and  cncusioms  are  the
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their  comments.1.  BACKGROUND:  TWVO  CONTRASTING  CASES
In some  developing  countries,  such  as  those in East Asia,  we observe  in the market  for
wage  labor  the felicitous  combination  of non-confrontational  labor  and a non-distributional,  or
encompassing,  elite. By "non-confrontational"  we mean  that wage  labor  was willing  not to, or
was  unable  to, use its collective  power  to extract  short  term  wage  and employment  gains.
Rather,  wage earners  accepted  wage  and  employment  levels  detemined,  respectively,  by the
interaction  of labor  supply  and demand  and  by the equalization  of  wages  and the marginal
product  of labor. When  labor  decided  on the non-confrontaiional  stance  voluntarily,  they did
so in the expectation  that  this market  oriented  approach  would  yield  attractive  labor  market
dyn2nics  - that firture  levels  of  wages  and employment  would  be higher  if workers
cooperated  with  management  than  if they  did not.
The key feature  of the "non-distnbutional"  or "encompasqkig'  elites behavior  was that
they  acted  as if their  fiture well-being  was  a function  of the fitre  wel-being  of those not in
the elite 2-all groups  benefited  as  the elite  adopted  a labor  demanding  development  strategy
that was  in accord  with  factor  endowments  and  comparative  advantage.  This strategy,  with
its favorable'impications  for  labor  market  dynamics,  not only  yielded  high  rates of growth,
but ensured  that the benefits  of growth  were  widely  shared. In this way,  it also  helped  ensure
that labor's  expectation  regarding  the  payoff  to non-confrontation  would  be filed.  This  in
tun reinforced  labor's  non-confrontational  attitude. 3
In  many other  countries  in  Afica, LatnAmerica and South  Asia,  we observe n the
labor  market  the less  attractive  combination  of confrontational  labor  and a distrbutonal elite.
In these  countries,  wage  eamers  consolidated  and exercised  their  colective  power,
successfUlly  lobbying  to raise  wages  above  market  levels,  and  above  income  levels  prevailing
among  the self-enployed  in agriculture  and elsewhere.  This  segmented  the labor market  and
1  Therefore,  the word  'non-coufrontational'  may  or mav  not indicate  the reut  of a purely  volunwy decisionL
2  The  terms  wencompassing  and "distibutionalm  for the  elite  are, trefre,  ued in a similar geeral  sene as
used by Olson (1982) for coalitions.
3  The elite cauld also have  been said to habze  been far-sighted, or nn-myopic, in the sense tihat  te  were
a-are  of the long-term gains from the policies,  and were willing  to enact policies to achieve those gains.created  a wage  labor  elite. Confrontational  labor also  succeeded  in  driving  a wedge  between
wages  and  the marginal  product  of labor  - as employers,  particularly  in  the public  sector,
succumbed  to pressure  to provide  more  (of  the now scarce,  relatively  high  wage)  employment
opportunities  than  warranted  by  the derived  demand  for labor. The  resulting  labor  market
dynamics  tended  to be unattractive:  that is, labor  demand,  wages  and  employment  grew more
slowly  than  in the non-confrontational  case and were eventually  eroded  in mary  countries.
The  deve!opme.lt  strategies  adopted  by distrbutional  elites  caused  the benefits  of what
growth  there mas  to be concentrated  in the hands  of a few. The  eEtes  behaved  as if they
believed  that  their  own  future  well-being  was independent  of the future  well-being  of non-
elites,  and  nearly  everyone  was  less  economically  secur' as a consequence.  Their  economic
strategies  tended  not  to be in harmony  with factor  endowments  and comparative  advantage.
While  these  strategies  may  bave  yielded  rents to the elites  in  the short  run, over  the longer  run
output  growth  uas slow  and employment  growth  slower  stil. This  behavior  of the elites
reinforced  labor's  confrontational  stance. 4
One  of these  two combinations  - non  -confrontational  labor  paired  with  non-
distributional  elites,  and  confrontational  labor  in a distributional  regime  - seem  to characterize
most developing  countries.  In a few  instances  we observe  non-confrontational,  marginalized
labor  coexisting  with  a distributional  regime. For  fairly  obvious  reasons,  however,  the fourth
possible  combination  - confrontational  labor  and a non-distnbutional,  market-oriented  elite  -
is not sustainable.
Table  1 illustrates  the results  of the two most common  combinations.  Over  the last
two decades,  countries  such  as those  in East and South-East  Asia,  which  had non-
distnibutional  elites  and  non-confiontational  labor,  demonstrated  far  superior  outcomes  for
both  labor  and  the elite  than  did other  developing  countries  where  distributional  elites
coexisted  with  confrontational  labor.
4 The distnbutional  elites thus behaved  mryopically,  discounting the future  heavily  while striving  to get as
much rent out of the present  as possible.[Insert  Table  I about  here)
The  welfare  of labor  as  a group  is  improved  by a rise  in real  eanings, and by  a rise  in
employment  in the high-wage  manufacturing  sector.  In this  way  workers  are drawn  out of
low-wage,  low-productivity  activities  at the same  time  that  eamings  in the high-wage  sector
are rising.  This  is  refected  in increases  in the  wage  bill. Between  1970  and 1990,  the wage
bill  in the  East Asian  countries  grew  at a rapid  rate  - in  Korea  and Indonesia,  it was  doubling
-bout every  five  years. The  lower  panel  of Table  1,  on the other  hand,  demnonstrates  that in
some  countries  labor's  welfare  actually  eroded,  while  in  others  (such  as India,  the Philippines
and Trinidad  and Tobago)  wages  and/or  employment  stapated.
In  this latter  group  of countries,  the elite  also  fared  badly. Although  they might  have
been  able  to carve  out a larger  share  of the national  economic  pie, that  pie grew  very  slowly.
Per capita  incomes  in half  of  the ten countries  shown  in  the lower  panel  of the  table feil  over
the 1970s  and 1980s,  and  grew  very  slowly  in the  others. The  difference  is especily marked
if  we look  at the growth  of per capita  incomes  in  East  Asia. The  economic  pie  there grew
rapidly  - so that the non-distributional  elite  in  these  countries,  even  if they  did  not increase
the size  of  their  slice  of the pie,  would  have  ended  up with  larger  returns  than  their  peers  in
Latin  America,  Africa  and South  Asia.
-Although,  for  most  of this  paper,  we  will  be  referring  to the two groups  very  broadly
as "labor"  and "elite,'  it is  useful  to recognize  the  obvious  - that neither  are monolithic
groups. This  is especially  true  for  the elite. In this  paper,  we  will  confine  our  attention  to
only  those  elite  groups  who  directly  affect  the  policymaking  process  and labor-elite
interactions.  These  are usually  alliances  of  three  distinct  groups  - the political  elite  (the  rulng
party,  president  or junta),  the economic  elite  (large  industry  and commercial  leaders)  and  the
policy  elite  (mtellectuals  and  bureaucrats).  A fourth  group,  the military,  is often  a major
influence  in policymaking  in some  developing  countries,  and may  be identified  with  the non-
3policymaking  political  elite.  Labor  in this  paper  almost  always  refers  to organized  wage  labor,
either  represented  by  large  national  trade  unions  or industry  groups. 5 Given  the possibility  of
heterogeneity  within  both  groups,  there  is occasion  for  dissent  and  conflicting  objectives.  In
cases  where  they arise,  the preferred  outcome  - non-confrontation  or confrontation  -- may  be
less  likely. 6 When  there  is  a less  unified  elite,  similarly,  the  preferred  outcome  by  the
policymaking  group  may  not  be endorsed  by competing  elites. 7
These  contrasting  cases  pose  two questions.  First,  what  determined  whether  a country
adopted  and  sustained  the  non-confrontational,  non-distributional  mode  of labor  market
behavior  or the confrontational,  distributional  mode?  Table  1 suggests  that  the combination
of  non-confrontational  labor  and non-distrbutional  development  strategies  bave  "paid  oft' for
the countries  that  followed  them,  while  distrbutional  strategies  and confrontational  labor  have
resulted  in slower  growth  and  lower  welfre for  most  groups  in society.
This  raises  our second  question.  When  countries  in which  labor  mark-et  problems  have
contributed  to poor  performance  are faced  with  this  reality,  why  doesn't  labor  become  non-
confrontational  and  why  don't  elites  adopt  a non-distributional  policy?  In essence,  this change
in the stance  of the two groups  is  what  the labor  market  dimension  of structural  adjustment
programs  is  trying  to accomplish,  but with  only  limited  success.  To rephrase  the question,  if
the advantages  of  non-confrontation  and encompassment  are so great,  why  is  it so difficult  to
accomplish  labor  market  reform?  In this paper,  we  will  concentrate  more  on answering  the
S lbere may  be  ciunstances  - for  eample,  when  the  are  rents  to be  shared  from  an inward-looldig
groith strategy-in wbch a labor clite forms  an alliance  with  the political  elite  at the  expen of the
majoriy  of the  labor  formc  See  our  discussion  below.
6 We  are,  in this paper,  especially  concerned  uith such  'coordination  failure when  labor  is organized  into
conicting  trade  unionsWe  discuss  this  in Scction  S. Possible  coordination  failure  among  Brazil's  clites  -
vwith  a struggle  for  power  ben  the  ural  and urban  elites,  domestic  idustiy and multinationals,  parts  of the
bureaucracy  and the  political  (militaly)  ladeship  - is discussed  in Evans  (1992),  pp. 166-72.
For example,  Bradford  (1994)  argues  that in East Asia,  fte elite  was  'morm  cohesive  and  singular  in
direction  than  in more  pluralistic  or politicized  societies.'  Therefore,  this cohesion  would  have  aided  the
formation  of an unified,  encompassing,  far-sighted  policy  in these  countries Zeitlin  and  Ratcliff  (1988),  on
the  other  hand,  found  that,  histoncally,  rlua and urban  elites  in Chile  were  united,  and  would  not allow  an
East-Asian  typc  industrial  fows.
4first  question. However,  in our discussion,  it will  become  evident  that the answer  to the
second  question  is dependent  on the answers  to the first.
Section  2 draws  on a two-sector  model  of the labor  market,  to draw  out the
implications  for the two polar  combinations  of elite  and  labor  strategies.  Section  3 then
elaborates  on some  key factors  that  are instrumental  in the choice  of these strategies  for the
two groups. Section  4 draws  on these  factors  to illustrate  the operation  of labor-elite
relations  for a few countries.  Section  5 is  a brief  discussion  of  the political  economy  of labor
market  reform,  and section  6 concludes  by  linking  the process  descnbed  here to trade,
migration  and growth.
2. SOME SIPLE  ANALYTICS
Figures 1 and 2 help  to illustate  why  nonistributional  policies  lead  to better
outcomes,  if combined  with  non-confrontational  labor? Frst, we  look at a simple  two sector
model  of the labor market,  comparing  the non-confrontational  labor,  non-distnrbitional  elite
(NCL-NDE)  case and  the confrontational  labor,  distnbutional  elite  (CL-DE)  case  with regard
to their  static  implications  for  incomes  and employment  in each  sector. We then focus  on the
sector  in which  wage  employment  is concentrated  and  compare  the labor  market  dynamics  of
these  two cases.
In Figure 1, total  labor  supply  is depicted  on the horizontal  axs, with employment  in
the non-wage  economy  (denoted  as rura employment  for convenience)  beig  measured  from
the left  hand origin  0 and urban  (or  formal  sector  wage)  employment  from  the right hand
origin  0'.  Marginal  products  and  wages  (retums  to labor)  are  measured  on the vertical  aids. 5
The margina product  acuves  of  the "rurar"  sector  and  the 'urban' sector  are mplr  and mplu.
In competitive  equilibrium,  of the sort  yielded  by  non-confrontational  labor,  non-distrbutional
elites,  a common  wage  rate (vw 1o = w 20), which  equals  the common  marginal  product of labor,
8  We  assume  for this simple  illustraon that  wagc  labor  is conccntrated  in the  urban sector  while  self-
employnment  is concentrated  in the  rual sector.
Sis established  and  employment  in sectors  1 and  2 is  respectively  OA  and  O'A. There  is  no
unemployment  and,  since  wage  jobs  are not more  attractive  than  self  employment,  there  is no
lobby  to expand  wage  employment  opportunities  beyond  the level  justified  by  the derived
demand  for  labor.
(Inser  Figure) about  hereJ
By  contrast,  in the confiontational  labor,  distributional  elite  case  labor  power  raises  the
urban  wage  to w 21, creating  a wage-eaming  elite,  with  the following  consequences:  the labor
ma-ket  is segmented,  w2l > wl, and  mplu  > mplr,  implying  an intersectoral  misallocation  of
labor,  with  rural  enployment  expanding  and  urban  employment  contracing.  Moreover,  given
the intersectoral  eamings  gap,  a probabilistic  migration  relationship  then  generates  urban
unemnployment- 9
Also,  because  urban  wage  employment  is  now so much  more  attractive  than  rural  self
emnployment,  both  the unemployed  and  those  employed  in the rural  sector  have  the potential
to become  a lobby  for  the creation  of more  high  paying  urban  jobs. There  is the risk  that the
public  sector  responds  by employmg  more  workers  than  warranted  by the derived  demand  for
labor,  implying  that  the demand  for  labor  shifts,  e.g.,  to du,  while  the marginal  product  curve
remains  the same.0 In this  case  a wedge  has  been  driven  between  the wage  and labores
marginal  product,  which  may  even  be zero. The  implication  of w > mpl.is  that enterprises
with  excess  employment  wnll  be loss-makers  and  thus  wil require  subsidization."
9 As  in  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970)  more  w  rs  will  mgreatc  to  thewuban  sector  th?m  there  are  jobs  available
implying  ta  the  sum  of mrl a-nd  urban  employment  is  less han  the  lbor forcem  he  unemplomcnt  is not
explicily  depicted  in Figutre  1.
10  As  Gelb,  Knight  and Sabot  (1991),  p. 1188,  point  out 'Job-seekers  rarely  form  a single  cohesive  lobby  but
videly  expressed  conerns lead  politicians  to provide  employment  -for  political  stability  and to co-opt
potendally  threatening  groups.  ... The  strength  of  demand  for public  sector  employment  should  increase ith
the gap  bet  the  publi sector  wage  and  the supply  prce of labor.  Govenmet rmsistancc  to the
employment  lobby  may  also  increase,  however,  becas  of countermiling  pressures  from  taxpayers  and
creditors.  These  are  among  the  factors  that  determine  the cxtent  of  ernmanning.'
11  Hence,  public  cnterpises  are more  likely  than  private  enterprises  to hire  surplus  labor. See  Baneji and
Sabot  (1994),  Campos  and  Esfahani  (1994)  and Gelb,  Knight  and Sabot  (1991).
6Figure  2 illustrates  the difference  between  the two cases  NCL-NDE  and  CL-DE,  in
their  implications  for the evolution  of wages  and  employpient  over  time. Figure  2a focuses  on
the case of non-confrontational  labor  in comb;na.on  with  a non-distributional  elite,  as
exemplifed  by Korea  or Taiwan.  From  the outset  wages,  at Wm,  and wage  employment,  at
Lm,  were market  determined. 12 Figure  2b focuses  on the case  of confrontational  labor  in
combination  with a distributional  elite,  as exemplified  by Ghana  or India. Though  in the first
period  the underlying  supply  and demand  conditions  are  the same  in both cases,  in  the CL-DE
case wages,  pushed  up to Wn,  are considerably  higher  and  wage  employment,  at Ln, is
considerably  lower than in the case of NCL-NDE.
Insert  Figure  2 about  herel
Consider  some  of  the ways  in which  the differences  in labor  market  statics  influenced
labor  market  dynamics:
In the first case.  (relatively)  undistorted  fitctor  prices  encouraged  the adoption  of
appropriate  technology  and a structure  of  production  in accord  with comparative
advantage. This,  in tumn  contributed  to the intemational  competitiveness  of domestic
enterprises,  hence  to rapid  growth  of demand  for their  output. The combination  of strong
demand  and low wages  contnbuted  to profitability.  The  non-distributional  elite  invested  a
high  proportion  of retained  earnings  which  resulted,  by the second  penod, in a substantial
increase  in output, hence  in the derived  demand  for  wage  labor. The growth  of labor
demand  outstripped  supply.  Not only  did  employment  increase,  to Lm2,  but because  of
the dramatic  demand  shif, wages  were  pulled  up  and  rose  steeply,  to Wm2.
*  By  contrast,  in the second  case,  because  of the  distortion  of factor  prices,  inappropriate,
labor-saving  technologies  were adopted  and  the structure  of production  was less  in accord
with comparative  advantage.  As a consequence,  the international  competitiveness,  and the
12 In countries  like Singapor  cooperation  by  labor  implied  wages  being  driven  down  to below market  levels.
7profitability  of domestic  enterprises,  was reduced.  The net effect  was  a reduction  in the
rate of growth  of output  and,  hence,  labor  demand.  Moreover,  the subsidies  required  to
finance  employment  when  w > mpl  diverted  savings  from  productive  investment,  further
diiinishing  the rate of growth  of labor  demand.  In the second  case the growth  of labor
demand  did not outstrip  supply  to the same  extent  as in the first  case. Because  the
demand  shift  was smaller,  employment  increased  only  to Lm3  (0-Lm3  < O-Lm2)  and,  on
the assumption  that over  time  labor's  capacity  to sutain wages  above  the market  clearing
level  was eroded,  wages  zaaggnaed  The growth  of labor  demand  was not sufficient  to
raise  wages  above  the level  to which  wages  were  pushed  in the first  period  by labor
power.
As  Figure  2b is drawn,  even  if the si*  in labor  demand  was  as great  in the second  as in
the first  case,  wages  would  still  be lower. This  is because  there  is less of a shift  in the
supply  of labor  in Figure  2a than in 2b. We are suggesting  that the slower  labor  force
growth  observed  in counties  following  a labor  demanding  growth  path  may,  in part, be
-eadogenous.  The growth  of employment  opportunities  and earnings  in the non-
confrontational  labor,  non-distbutional  elite  case  raises  the opportnity cost  for women
of having  children.  Also.  the greater  shift  in demand  is likely  to raise  the expected  returns
to investment  in education,  and to cse the household  liquidity  constraints  on such
iestmes,  thereby  rasg  the demand  for schooing. Likewise,  public  resources  for
schooling  may  be more  abundant,  raising  the supply  of educational  opportunities. 13
Higher  levels  of nvestment  in educaton  slows  the growth  of supply  of unskldled  labor  by
loweing frtility rates  (particulrly  among educated  women)  and by raising  the proportion
of the labor  force  that is skillced.  As skill  levels  ise, countries  can also exploit  newer,  skill-
based  manufacturing  technnlogies,  which  shifts  out the labor  demand  curve  firther. 14
33  Sec Birdsall and Sabot (1993) for a more  detailed  discussion  of the feefdack frcm morc rapid output and
cmploimewt grow'th  to higher invesunt  in cducationL
14  AS suggesed by Wood (1994).
8In sum,  the result  of  the interaction  of non-confrontational  labor  with non-
distributional  elites  was, as shown  in Figure  2a, that both employment  opportunities  and
wages  increased  as a result  of rapidly  increaing  labor  demand. A growing  proportion  ofthe
labor  force  held  wage  jobs  at steadily  incrasing  levels  of remunertion. Likewise,  for non-
distribuional  elites  there  may  have  been  two advantages  of  the non-confrontational,
encompassing  approach:  first,  faser output  growth  and  .eater  profitability  of enterprises
implies  higher  absolute  incomes  and,  if labor  is satisfied  by rapidly  growing  absolute  incomes,
perhaps  even  a larger  slice  of the  pie;  second,  non-confrontatinal  (and,  in most  cases,
content)  labor  meant  that non-distributional  eites could  extract  these  high  returns  in more
periods  (i.e.,  they  were not deposed  or forced  to adopt  growth-consaning populist  policies
to placate  labor).
The result  of  the interaction  of confrontational  labor  with  a distributional  elite  was
quite  different Initially,  confAontational  labor  gained  relative  to non-confrontational  labor  by
pusing wages  (and  often  employment)  to levels  higher  than mzrket  forces  alone  would  yield.
Likewise,  a distrbutional  elite  may  have  initially  benefited  relative  to a non-distrbutional  elite
from  the more  capital  intensive,  rent-seeking  growth  path on which  it embarked.  However,
the problems,  to which  the distorted  labor  market  coatributed,  resulted  in slower  growth  of
wages  and enployment,  so that by the  Second  period  levels  of wages  and wage  employme
were considerably  lower  in this case  than  in the non-corontaion  labor,  non-distributional
Jite case. Indeed,  in many ourdies,  under  adjustment  proprns,  wages  and  wage
employment  were  reduced  to levels  below  those  which  prevailed  in the inital period. In these
cases  the proportion  of  the labor  force  in wage  employment  would  also  have  declined,  with a
corresponding  increase  in employment  in the non-wage  economy.  Similarly,  the incomes  of
distnrbutional  elites  were  Rley to be lower  im  the second  period  than  the incomes  of non-
distnrbutional  elites. Moreover,  in  this case  labor  unrest and economic  ills  posed an incr'asing
threat  to the political  and  economnic  security  of the elite. And  the elite  woud be more  likely  to
9resort to other  growth-constraining  populist  policies  in an attempt  to maintain  their  hold  on
power,  leading  to a vicious  cycle  of  wage-employment  stagnation  and inappropriate  policies.
3.  DETERMNANTS  OF THE  CHOICE BETWEEN  NCL-NDE  AND  CL-DE IN A
SIMPLE STRATEGIC  FRAMEWORK
Envision  a "social  contract"  between  the elite  and labor,  the nature  of which  is the
result of a process  of negotiation,  implicit  or explicit.  The  elite  needs  the support  of labor
(organized,  as in India,  or unorganized,  as in Egypt  or Ghana)  to stay  in power. Labor  needs
the elite  to set  up the producfive  fammework  to provide  its returns  -employment  and/or  high
wages. The  initial  period  can  be thought  of as either  the period  following  independence  for  a
developing  country,  or one  where  tlhere  has  been  a major  regime  change. At this time,  both
labor  and the elite  have  to decide  on their  respective  courses  of action  for future  periods.
What  determines  wheffier,  initialy,  the non-confrontational/non-distributional  combination  or
the confrontational/distributional  paradigm  emerges?
We focus  on five  determinants.  Three  of these  factors  - the degree  of contestability,
inteUlectual  heritage  and the structure  of  the labor  market  - are exogenous;  :hey affect  the
two endogenous  factors  - the credibility  of both  labor  and  the elite  in their dealings  with  the
other  group, and  the elite's  choice  of agricultural  and trade policies.  Chart I summarizes  how
these  factors  influence  the choice  of stances  by labor  and the elite.
[Insert  Chart  I about  herej
i) Contestability:
A consideration  for the elite  is  whether  they  will  continue  to enjoy  power,  and hence
the fruits  of  their  policy  decisions.  Thu:. the extent  to which  their power  is "contestable"  by
10other  groups  in  the economy  is  important  to them.'  5 In particular,  the ruling  elite's  choice
about  whether  to be distributional  or not is likely  to be influenced  by the magnitude  of  the
threat  from  groups  whose  power  base  is  the poor. The  poor  generally  do not  benefit  from
distributional  policies.  Such  policies,  therefore,  may  increase  the poors support  of contestng
groups. By  contrast,  all groups  are  likely  to be beneficiaries  of the growth  promoted  by non-
distributional  policies.
East  Asia  provides  an  example  of how  the elite  can  use  non-distributional  policies  to
reduce  the threat  of contestability  by  groups  who rely  on the poor  as their  source  of  power.
The  legitimacy  of governing  elites  was  not securely  established  there,  and  they  were  in
competition  with  domestic  communist  insurgents,  backed  by powerfil  external  forces,  for  the
political  allegiance  of  those  in  the  bottom  half  of the distnbution  of income.  Therefore,  the
goveming  elite  in  East  Asia  came  to perceive  that their  future  political  and  economic  well-
being  depended  on the  future  well-being  of  the poor.
To widen  the  base  of  their  political  support,  leaders  used  a variety  of  tools,  including
land  reform  in  Korea  and  Taiwan,  public  housing  in Hong  Kong  and Singapore,  investment  in
rural  infrastructure  in  Indonesia  and  widespread  high  quality  basic  education.  Most  important
was  their  commitment  to a labor  demanding  growth  path. The  aim  of these  "shared  growth"
policies  was to ensure  that  allgroups  in the population  benefited  visibly  from  growth.' 6 As
more  and more  workers  were  puiled  into  the wage  sector  with  higher  and  higher  wages,  the
threat  to the elite  posed  by  the  poor  declined.
In Africa,  Latin  America  and  South  Asia,  the power  of the ruling  elite  was  less
contestable.  Hence  their  wilingness  to adopt  policies  that increased  their  share of  the 'pie"
and-by acquiescing  to premature  increases  in wages  and  employment-the  share  received  by
organized  labor  groups,  at the  cost  of a slower  rate of  increase  in the size  of  the pie as a
15  As Grindle  (1991),  p. 53.  says: Political  stability  and the  mainttnance  of  power  tend  to be major
preoccupations  of ... political  actors  [in  dcvloping  countries]  beamuse,  in many  cases,  thev  arc  vulnerable  to
the loss  of political  pomer."
16  See  Birdsall,  Ross  and  Sabot  (1994),  Campos  and  Root  (1994)  and C .zpter  4 of World  Bank  (1993a)  for
additional  discussion  of  *shared  gronith"  in Es  Asia.whole. Implicit  was a pact between  the elite  and wage  labor  to maxumize  their  shares  of the
r  . .r
pie  at the expense  of the poor. The  political  costs  of long  run  stagnation  of wages  and
employment  were  not as high  as they  were  in East Asia. Moreover,  repression  of dissent  was
often  a more  feasible  option  in Africa,  Latin  America  and South  Asia  than  in East Asia,  where
potential  dissidents  coud enlist  the support  of powerfiu  allies.
In more  recent  years,  there  has  been  a new  source  of contestability  for the elite in Asia
and  the middle  east  The  rise of religious  fimdamentalism  - including  Islamic  fimdamentalism
in counties lke Egypt,  Algenia,  Paistan, Bangladesh  and  Turkey,  and Hindu  and Sikh
fundamentlism  in India- has drawn  heavily  on the unemployed  and economicaUly  deprived
sections  of society  for their sustenance.  FundamentaList  movements,  therefore,  may  have
provided  an element  of contestability  for  the distnbutional  elite  in some  of these  countries.
Hlowever,  whether  this contestability  influences  the elie in  these  countries  to adopt more  non-
distributional  policies  will  depend,  in addition,  on  the importance  of other  fictors such  as their
intellectual  heritage,  natural  resource  endowments,  and  the strategies  chosen  by labor.
j)  Inidectual  keitage.
The dominant  inteUectual  heritage  influenced  labors  choice  between  confrontation  and
non-confonation  and the elite's  choice  betwen disriutional and  non-distnrbutional  poficies.
This  fiamework  of  ideas,  often  inherited  from  ex-colonial  rulers  or post-colonial  advisors,
influenced  the evaluation  of the relative  attractiveness  of  fitumre  options. In extreme  cases,
ideology  seemed  to preclude  a strategy  choice  from  the feasible  set of options;  in other  cases
it affected  the expected  size  of payoffs. 17
For example,  Fabian  socialists  believed  that strict  reliance  on the market  might  yield
rapid  economic  growth  in the short  run,  but also  a highly  unequal  distribution  of income
17 Beliefs  are  often  hd  as  unontestable  or axiomatic.  Members  of  the  group  subscribing  to an ideology
sincerely  bieve in its  univcrsl  validity,  cven  though  it may  seem  irrational  or  unsound  to the  outside
obserrer  (seC  Gondwvc  1992). We  will  daactiz  groups  holding  such  deeply  beld  beliefs  as uideological,
as  opposed  to more pragmatic'  groups  who  have  a predisposition  towmrds,  but  not  a blind  commitment  to,
these  bcliefs.
12which,  in addition  to being  unfair,  would  undermine  the political  stability  necessary  to sustain
such  growth.  They  recommended  state  control  of the 'commanding  heights"  of the economy
and extensive  government  intervention  as a means  of  preventing  unpalatable  distributional
side-effects  of  the free  operation  of  markets. This  set orideas  had  a profound  influence  on
such  leaders  as  Nasser,  Nehru,  Nkrumah,  and  Nyerere  who were  instr  in  deigng  the
initial  policy  framework  for  their  countries.  Distrust  of  markets  was  a factor  in  their  choice  of
inwd-looldng policies  which,  in turn,  was a factor  in their  acquiescence  to the wage  and
employment  demands  of  wage  labor. The  result  of negotiations  with  labor  with  regard  to the
distribution  of  the  rents  from  import-substitution  often  yielded  high  short-term  returns  to the
elites  in these  socialist  economies.
Socialist  thougwith  its roots  in Marxism  and the necessity  of confict  between  the
interests  of labor  and  private  capital also  influenced  labor's  view  of  the wodd,  of  what  was
feasible  and  desirable.  Ideologicaly  "leist  groups  dimissed  as naive  the  idea  that
everyone's  welfire  would  be aehanced  by cooperation  between  labor  and  capital.  They
believed  that  the elite  Cm  teir role  as capitalists)  were  fhndamentaly  incapable  of sharing  the
fiuits  of gowth equitably.  This  was  coupled  wfit a distrust  of mawkets,  which  were  perceived
to be manipulated  by the  elte. Leftist  labor  concluded  that  the only  way  to avoid  being
exploited  by capitalists  was  to organize  collectvely  and press  for  the most  fiaorble terms  of
employment.
In a imilaryw  , the structras  beiefs  of Raul  Prebisch  and  others,  and  their
associated  export  pesimism,  influenced  the decisions  of Latin  American  leaders  to fobow  an
inward-looldng  development  strategy.  A commitment  to st  nalsm implied  a reection of
the labor-demanding  non-distriional strafegy.  World  markets  were  seen  to be so  biased
against  low  income  countries  that policies  that encoraged deelopmt  in accord  with
relative  fiator  prices  and  comparave  advantage  would  not yield  rapid  growtl  Hence,
external  orientation  was  reected  as an option  at the outset,  i.e.. excluded  from  the information
set.
13By  contrast,  capitalistic,  market  oriented  ideologies  were  influential  in countries  in
East  Asia  and in post-1973  Chile. In  Korea  and  Taiwan,  which  had  been  Japanese  colonies,
Japanese  notions  of appropriate  development  strategy  appear  to have  been  influential.  It was
Japan  that pioneered  both  the export  oriented  development  strategy  and the paradigm  of
cooperation  between  labor  and corporate  management.  In East  Asia,  therefore,  the ideas
underlying  eicompassing  policies  were  part  of the  information  set, and  the policies  were
perceived  to be potentially  effective.  Pro-market  American  ideas  and  mercantilist  British  ideas
(e.g.,  in Hong  Kong)  reinforced  the market-orientation  of Japanese  ideas. In post-Allende
Chile,  an influential  group  of economists  and  policy-makers  was  schooled  in the  University  of
Chicago  doctrine  of free  markets.
iii) Specificpolicies  adopted  by tke edte:
a) A dynamic  agricultural  sector:
In most developing  countries,  pricing,  public  investment,  taxation  and  trade  policies  all
tended  to be biased  against  agriculture.  The  rationale:  the  tansfer of  resources  to the
potentially  more  dynanic  urban  industrial  sector.  The  consequence:  stagnant  agriculture.  The
exception  were  East Asian  countries,  which  tended  to avoid  such  a policy  bias  agamst
agriculture.  A larger  share  of public  investment  was  allocated  to rural  areas  in East Asia  than
in other  !ow  and middle  income  economies.  Equally  important,  levels  of direct  and indirect
taxation  of agriculture  were lower  in  East Asia han  in  other  regions.?'
Whether  agriculnual  incomes  are stagnant  or increasing  rapidly  has important
implications  for the wage  labor  market  and  for  labor's  choice  between  non-confrontation  and
confrontation.  In particular,  when  rural  incomes  are  stagnant,  then  so too is  the supply  price
of urban  labor. In this  case,  even  if the demand  for  urban  labor  is growing,  the market  wage
will  not  increase  - trying  the patience  of labor,  and  jeopardizing  any  inclination  by them  to be
non-confrontational.  If at the same  time,  the output  and  profits  of urban  enterprises  are
38  World  Bank  (1993a).  pp. 32-37.
14increasing  while  urban  wages  are not,  the stage  will  be set  for  collective  action  by  labor  to
push  up their  returns  and  segment  the market.  Arguments  for  higher  wages  will  be made  on
the basis  of ability  to pay  and  fairness  in  the distnbution  of factor  shares,  and  sight  is likely  to
be lost of  the inequity  of large  rurl-urban  income  gaps  and  of  the long  run  costs  of labor
market  segmentation.  In sum,  policies  that discimiate against  agriculture  and  yield  stagnt
rural  incomes,are  also  likely  to result  in non-confrontation  giving  way  to conflict  in  the urban
labor  market
By conrst, when  rural  incomes  grow  rapidly,  so  too wl  the  supply  price  of urban
labor. Increases  in the  deand for  urban  labor  will,  therefore,  yield  increases  in  urban  wages.
In this  case,  rapid  growth  of  urban  incomes  is consstent  with  an integrated  labor  market.
There  is, therefore,  less  incentive  for  labor  to demand  better  outcomes  than  those  yielded  by
the interaction  of labor  supply  and  demand,  less of a tendency  for  labor  to shift  from  non-
confrontation  to conflic4  and  a lower  probabiity  that  the labor  market  will  be segmented.
The  bottom  line  here  is hat, when  the agricultral  sector  is dynamic  and  the supply  price  of
labor  is rising,  it is  easier  to adhre to market  determined  outcomes  in the  wage  labor  market
With  a stagat  agricultural  sector,  on the other  hand,  the  rning dite is  more  likely  to use
non-market  or interntionist mechanisms  to 'partition  the pie".
In Taiwan,  for  instance,  mang  wages  only  a fifth  higher  than  agricultural
wages. This  remarkably  integrated  labor  market  made  it easier  to pursue  the non-
confrontational  labor,  non-disiutional elite  strategies By  conra,  workers  with  the same
skill  level  in Colombia  and  Jamaica  earn  150  percen more  in  non-agriculua activities  than  in
agrcultural  work. In  India,  mg  wages  have  consitently  been  about  four  times
agricultural  wages  since  the 1960s.  Even  larger  differentials  have  been  seen  for  East  Afican
countries.  Market-detemined  outcomes  were  more  difficult  to adhere  to in these  countries. 19
1  Birdsall  and Sabot  (1993).
- *  1~~~~~25b) Export  Orientation:
Countrieswhich  chose  the non-distributional,  non-confrontational  combination  tended
to have  policies  which  encouraged  exports.  In countries  that chose  the distributional,
confrontational  combination,  policies  tended  to result  in  more  closed  econonies. Export
onentation  implies  compettive  pressure  from  abroad. Tbis  competition  helped  both labor  and
the elite  to realize  that in  firms  producing  tradables,  pushing  levels  of wages  and employment
beyond  those determined  by  the market  would  resut in their  products  being  non-competitive.
This  would  jeopardize  the vezy  exstence  of the firms  yielding  retums  to both groups.
Moreover,  the same  competitive  pressures  helped  create  a lobby  of exporters  which
demanded  more efficient  performance  from  those  firms,  often  public  enterprises,  which
provided  the necessary  non-tradable  inputs  for  production.  This  limited  the tolerance  for
excess  wages  and employment  in the publc sector. Finally,  those  economies  that adopted  a
policy  of openness  benefited  from  the easier  access  to imported  capital  equipment  and
technology,  which  in turn  improved  the produciity and  wages  of wage  labor.
In inward-looking  economies,  on the other  hand,  protected  markets  meant  that
inefficiencies  in the utilizafion  of labor  could  be passed  on to consumers  in the form of higher
prices. There  was less risk  that  lack  of competitiveness  in  world  markets  would  result in the
ailure  of the firm,  making  it easier  for both  the elite  and  labor  to concentrate  on ways  to
increase  their  short-term  retumrs.
This  begs  a question:  why  did policy  makers  in East  Asia  or Cbile  choose  a more
export-oriented  strategy  than did  policymakers  in other  regpons?  The discussion,  above,  of
the difference  among  regions  in  intellectual  heritage  suggests  one  fictor. The discussion  of
contestability  and lack  of policy  bias  against  agriculture  suggest  others. In inward-loolkng
economies,  low income  consumers  had no real power  to threaten  the tenure  of the elite,  and
thuS  no credhble  way  to oppose  excessive  prices  for  consumer  goods.
There  is yet another  reason. Countric with  abundant  natural  resources  are less
compelled  to adopt outward  oriented  policies,  since  they  can  rely  on commodity  or mineral
3.6exports  to finance  inputs  needed  by import  substituting  manufacturing  indusuries  (Ranis,
1991). The  Southeast  Asian  countries  (Malaysia,  Indonesia  and  Thailand),  which  are much
better  endowed  with  natural  resources  than  their  counterparts  in  Northeast  Asia  (Japan,  Korea
and Taiwan)  have  on average  a lower  reliance  on trade. 20
fi  ser  Tabe 2 about  he)
Avoiding  an overaued exchange  rate  is crucial  to an export  promotion  strategy;  an
overvalued  exchange  rate  tends  to discriminate  against  the agriculural  sector. Hence,  those
factors  that reduce  the  likelihood  of discrinating against  agriculture,  such  as  the risk  that
discimination  will  strengthen  the hand of insurgents  in the competition  for the political  loyalty
of rural  residents,  are also  likely  to provide  an environent conducive  to an export-oriented
strategy.  Moreover,  if apid  and sugtainable  improvements  in the standard  of lving  of  the
poor are considered  necessary  to win  the competition  with  insurgt,  then  inmasing  the
demand  for labor  is  likely  to be a goal Undercutting  prevailing  prices  in foreign  markets  is
one way  to ensure  virtally infintely  elastic  demand  for output  and  rapid  growth  of demand
for labor.
iv) CredibiliCy:
Labor's  choice  between  confrontation  and  non-confrontation  and  the elite's  choice
between  distrbutional  and  non-distnrbtrional  policies  was  influenced  by perceptons  about  the
other  group's  commitment  to an avowed  stance.  The  issue  here  goes  beyond  the question  of
whether  these  groups  are  capable  of visualiing  the  time-paths  of  rets  yielded  by the
altenatives  they  face. The  relevant  point  is whether  each  group  perceid  the other  to be
20  The  grcater  trade  orientadon  of the  Norteast Asian  coontries  also  influed  their  agailtural policies
Their  relative stronger  focus  on exporinglabor  intensivemanufactued  products  cted  incras  demand
for the  processing  or  agicultual products  which  in tun led  to greate demand  for  labor  during  the  off  ssn
(Oshima  1993).
17capable  of sustaining  their  conunitment  to the chosen  path. For  example,  it may  be clear  to
both parties  that if non-confrontational  and non-distnbutive  policies  are sustained,  the labor
market  dynamics  and  the returns  to the elite  are superior  to those  offered  by confrontation  and
distributive  policies.  Nevertheless,  if  they perceive  the probability  of defection  of the other
group  to be high,  labor  or the elite  may  conclude  that the expected  returs to them  of
confrontational  or distributional  policies  are higher.
The choice  of paths  is thus  finked  to the perceived  likelihood  of non-defection  by the
opposing  group-to its "reputation.' The  history  of interaction  between  the groups  is a
determinant  of reputation.  If past actions  have  shown  that the elite  has  a predilection  for
distributive  policies,  for example,  labor  would  be suspicious  of a sudden  profession  of more
encompassing  intentions.  Similarly,  the eite woud be wwy of promises  of cooperation  from
a traditionally  antagonistic  labor  force.
How much  these  concerns  would  affect  the actual  choice  of strategy  would  depend
partly  on the relative  sizes  of alternative  payoffs  from  each  strategy,  and partly  on whether  or
not there are external  factors-commitment  mechanisms-which  help  to cement  each  group's
adherence  to a professed  strategy. Commitment  mechanisms  differ  among  countries.  In some
societies,  social  'focalpoints', which  are culturally  determined  "meeting  points"  for
expectations  of the different  groups,  may  help cement  or destroy  labor-elite  relations. 23
Political  risk  may  also  affect  credibility.  For example,  in a politically  unstable  society,  the
elite  might  perceive  that future  payoffs  would  accue to a political  rival. Thus,  the elite  might
be tempted  to maximize  the short-term  returns  (from  distributive  policies)  rather  than hold  out
for  larger  future  gains. To the extent  that this is understood  by labor,  the credibility  of the
elite's  promise  of cooperation  and encompassing  policies  may  be lower.
v) Labor Maret  Stucinre:
21  S-hejjing (1960).
18a) "Insider-Outsider"  Divisions:  Wage  labor  may  not care  as much  about  employment
growth  as it does for  increases  in wages. A division  between  'insiders"  and "outsiders'  could
explain  why. Negotiations  with  the elite  are conducted  by "insiders"--a  labor  elite  who
already  hold  wage  jobs. They  do not necessarily  care  whether  "outsiders"  obtain  wage
employment.  Insiders  may  see  attempts  to push  wages  up, above  the competitive  level,  as
more  rewarding  to them  than a growth  in labor  demand  which  may  pull  wages  up at some
point  in  the future. They  may  actually  oppose  employment  increases  if they  believe  such
increases  would  erode  rents. 22
Insiders  have  been  adept  at negotiating  rent-sharing  pacts  with distributional  elites,
with  an adverse  impact  on outsiders.  In several  of the countries  that  followed  the
confrontational  labor,  distributional  elite  patb,  this  was  achieved  by restrictions  on labor
retrencihment  in both the public  and private  sectors,  which  assured  stability  in employment  for
wage  labor,  allowing  them  to concentrate  on seeldng  increased  wages. 23 Such  a pact
generally  precluded  an outward  oriented  labor  demanding  growth  strategy. Outsiders  were
left  worse  off  than before,  as the persistence  of invard-looldng  strategies  prevented  them  from
obtaining  wage  jobs.
b) Coordination  failures:  In some  countries,  the lack  of a unified  voice  representing  labor
may  influence  whether  favorable  labor  market  outcomes  are adopted. There  are two distinct
forms  of labor  organization  that are  relevant  here. First,  there  may  be relatively  few powerful
trade union  organizations  which  jockey  for  power  and  rents-one might  call  this a labor  union
'oligopoly".  This  is currently  the case  in India,  for  example.  Second,  laborers  may  be
22  This could happen if, for example, public  entrprise  increase  employment  beyond those  justified by the
derived  demand for labor. At the same time, if the wage bill is prevented  from rising, wages would  be reduced
to leels  closer to labors supply price. For evidence  of such  behavior in developing countries, see  Baneiji and
Sabot  (1994).
23  Increases  in real wages may or may  not have materialized. For example,  average wages  seem to have
declined in Zambia  However, two  factors suggest  themselves. First, real wages  may have been even lower
(given Zambia's steep  economic decline) in the absence  of labor lobbying. Second, and perhaps more
important, in countries like India, labor may  believe  that lobbying  is necessary  to avoid an erosion of wages
even if employment  grows. This belief may influence  the behavior  of insiders.relatively  unorganized,  or organized  into  numerous  small,  firm-level  associations,  as
exemplified  by Japan. In each  of these  two cases,  the failure  among  the different  labor  unions
to coordinate  their  strategies  may  affect  the  final  outcomes  of their  implicit  negotiations  with
the elite.
In the first  case of oligopolistic  unions,  there may  be tensions  among  unions  of sharply
differing  ideologies,  with  some  being  fundamentally  opposed  to non-confrontation.  Even
when  other  unions  recognize  that non-confrontation  is a superior  outcome,  lack  of credible
conmnunication  among  the competing  union  organizations  may  result  in the inferior  outcome
being  adopted. Since  non-confrontation  is only  a superior  outcome  when  adopted  by all
labor,  mutual  mistrnst  could  thus  force  even  the less  ideological  unions  to reject  non-
confrontation  and  to attempt  to maximize  short  term  gains. In the second  case,  when  unions.
are fragnented,  the reverse  could  be true. Even  if individual  labor  organizations  are interested
in adopting  a confrontational  stance  in order  to form  a rent-sharing  pact  with  the elite,  they
may  be unable  to pull  together  all  the widely  dispersed  labor  factions  into  a credible  group
which  is committed  to confrontation  and  rent-extraction.
The  factors  outlined  above  - contestability,  intellectual  heritage,  eLte  policies,
credibility  and  labor  market  structure  - are  not of equal  importance;  neither  do they affect
each  group  equally.  For  the elite,  contestability  and  intelUectual  heritage  are the two
exogenous  factors (as was shown  in Chart 1). These two detemiinants  interact  in their
influence  on trade  and agricultural  policy.  The  policies,  as well  as  the intellectual  heritage  and
the degree  of contestability,  generate  the  level  of credibility  the elite  bring  tc their  interactions
with  labor. For  labor,  there  are also  two  exogenous  factors-labor's  own  intellectual  heritage,
and the structure  of the labor  market,  particularly  the division  between  insiders  and  outsiders
and possible  coordination  failure.  These  interct to define  labor's  bargaining  stance,  and its
credibility  to the elite.
204.  STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS AND OUTCOMES
We focus on a few country case studies  to highlight  the various dimensions  of the
strategic choices by the elite  and labor. We envision  these choices  being made in the context
of a 'game'  played  by the elite, who choose between being  distributional  or non-distributional,
and by labor, whose choice is between confrontation  and non-confrontation. 24 Each group is
seeldng the maximum  payoff from its strategy,  having  taken into account their assessment of
the strategy the other group would adopt.  This focus on strategic considerations can aid our
understanding  of why the combination  of confrontational  labor and a distributional elite
emerged  in so many  economies,  while the more attractive  combination  of non-confrontational
labor and a non-distrbutional elite prevailed  only in a few economies. 25
Why did the elite in India choose distributional  policies  while Indian labor chose
confrontation? Why did these strategic choices  persist? And  why, by contrast, did some of
India's  neighbors in East Asia choose a more encompassing  and non-confrontationai strategy?
And why did the elite in some of them (e.g., Singapore  and Malaysia)  consider it necessary at
times to enforce the non-confrontational  stance of labor? The factors discussed above suggest
answers to these questions. 26
A)  Distiution  and Confrontadon:  India in the 1950s  At independence,  the framework
for India's economic  policy was set by a group of elite  bureaucrats, who shared an ideological
commitment  to Fabian  socialistic  policies  with India's  first prime minister, Jawaharlal
NehrU. 2 7 They did not believe  that the interactions  between buyers and sellers in unfettered
24  The  game-tl=retic model  is developed  in greater  detail  in Banerji,  Campos  and Sabot  (forthcoming,  a).
25  As North (1990:15)  rightly  points  out:  ... there  is a vast  gapbetween  the reatively clean,  precise,  and
simple  world  of game  theory  and the complex,  imprecise,  and fumbling  way  by  which human  beings  have
gone about  structuring  human  interacmon.'  Hover,  game  theoiy  does  pmvide  the fiamework  for a basic
undectnding of strategic  decisions,  as is demonstrated  by  North  using  the framework  himself  later in the
same  book  (1990:  564).
26  Factors other than the ones discussed,  such as the presence  of a substantial stock of exportable natural
resources  may have also influenced the choice of strategies  by labor and the elite.
27  Nechru  has been characterized  as"a Kashmiri Bmhmin ... [who]  was also a Fabian socialist with Marxist
sympathies  who had suffered an upper-class English educatior." (Joshi and Little 1994,  p. 8)
21markets  could  stimulate  growth  and  reduce  either  inequality  or poverty. The expectation  was
that "market  failures",  which  resulted  from  "striLtural  rigidities",  would  both constrain  growth
and perpetuate  inequality. 28 Their  skepticism  about  the benefits  of trade was  based  on the
belief  that the de-industriaization  of India  in the eighteenth  and nineteenth  centuries  was
caused  by the free  inflow  of  British  manufacturing  products. Indeed,  one of the defining
moments  of the Indian  independence  movement  had been  the swadeshi  epoch,  where  foreign
goods  were boycotted  and  bumt  in public.
The Indian  government,  which,  it was  assumed,  would  behave  as a benevolent  social
guardian,  took control  of the "commanding  heights"  of the economy  (arge, capital-intensive,
formal  sector  industry)  ane  attempted  to compensate  for market  failures.  Prices  of many
industral products  were  administered,  as were exchange  and  interest  rates. An inward-
looking,  public  enterprise  led  development  strategy  was adopted,  with  the government  as a
major  formal  sector  employer. 29
Of the factors  we  have  considered,  "intellectual  heritage"  had  the strongest  influence
on the initial  strategic  choice  made  by the Indian  elite. Contestability  was not an issue:  the
Congress  Party,  drew  its support  from  rich  and poor alike; while  the small  communist  party
did influence  trade  unions,  it had no real chance  of assuming  power. The elite's  choice  of a
distributional  strategy  was  not the result  of short-term  rent-seeking  but based  on  the belief
that a non-distnbutional  strategy  would  have  low  retums. The elite's  choice  does  not seem  to
have  been  much  influenced  by  their  expectations  of labor's  choice  between  confrontation  and
non-confrontation.
Therefore,  when  choosing  their  strategy,  Indian  labor  already  knew  the strategy  of the
elite. It was evident  that since  market  forces  would  not determine  wages  and employment,
rents would  emerge  from  elite-labor  negotiation. Under  the import-substituting  regime,
2 8 Structral  rigidities,  defined  as a lack of responsive  to price signals, were considered  to be much more
severe  in low than in high income  countries. See  Krueger (1990).
2 9 Krueger  (1990)  notes  that *the  scope  and height  of protection  was...far  greater  than could  be defended  on
infant industry  grounds."  Bhagwati  and Srinismsan  (1975)  found  that in 1968-69  more  than half  of India's
industries  had effective  rates  of  protection  in excess  of 100  percent.
22there was  a greater  opportunity  for  the costs  of higher  wages  and excess  employment  to be
passed  on as higher  prices. In the absence  of contestability  from  poor  consumers,  it was less
likely  that  the elite  would  resist  pressure  by labor  to push  their  wages  and employment  beyond
ttie levels  the market  would  determine.  In sum,  the elite's  comnmitment  to non-market  oriented
policies  under  a non-contestable  regime  ensured  that Indian  labor  perceived  confrontation  to
be a superior  strategy,  though  Indian  labors  own  leftist  ideological  stance  would  have  led
them  towards  the same  conclusion.
B) Distribution  and Confrontation  confinued *nda  in the 1970s. Why  were distributional-
confrontational  policies  still  followed  during  the regime  of  Nehru's  daughter,  Indira  Gandhi,
when  she and  the Indian  elite  had  become  much  less  ideologicaly  committed  and much  more.
pragmatic  in their  world-view?  The  question  is especially  relevant  because  evidence  was
accumulating  that the nondistibutional,  non-confrontational  paradigm  was bearing  fiuit in
the countries  which  had adopted  it.
The  answer  is more  complex,  since  in the 1970s,  neither  labor  nor  the eite in India  had
prior knowledge  of what the other  group  would  do-ie., the game  was  played  with
'incomplete  information".  For  the more  pragmatic  Indian  elites,  it was clear  that negotiating
with  non-confrontational  labor  in a distnbutional  environment  would  tend to yield  rents to the
elite  much  larger  than the short-run  returns  yieded  by  the choice  of non-distributional  policies.
The pie  might  be smaller,  but the elite's  share  of the pie  woud be largerin  a situation  where
shares  are negotiated,  and  labor  does  not agitate  for  higher  shares. This  presumes  that, as
before,  the elite  had no fear  of contestability,  and  so were  not concerned  about  the eff&cts  of
depriving  the poor of the higher  retums  they  would  have  obtained  under  a non-distributional
policy  regime.
But what  if labor  chose  to be confrontational?  Even  in this case,  the elite  in India
seemed  to realize  that non-market,  distnbutional  policies  would  be better  for them. The elite
saw  the possibility  of an alliance  with  wage  labor  that  would  enable  these  two groups to
23extract rents  from  the  wage  sector  at the expense  of stakeholders  in the rest of the
economy. 30 These  stakeholders  would  be denied  the benefit  of increased  wage  employment;
moreover,  they  would  fa.ce  higher  prices  for goods  produced  by wage  labor. The elite,
thcirefore,  had to be concerned  about  popular  unrest. Once  again,  the lack  of contestability  is
an important  factor.
What  about  labor's  choice?  If  the elite  chose  to be distributional,  then,  as in the
situation  discussed  above,  it would  be in labor's interest  to be confrontational.  But what
migh labor  have  done  if  the eite had decided  to be non-distnbutional?
The  ideological  bent  of  orgnized labor  in India  is a factor. Leftist  labor  did not
believe  that market  forces  would  yield  higher  retums  to labor. On the contay, they  saw  the
potential  for market  forces  to erode  the gains  (rents)  they  had made. 31 Having  a high
discount  rate, labor  groups  focused  an more  certain  present  losses  than  on doubtful  future
gains. This  reinforced  their  commitment  to the confrontational  status  quo. The structure  of
the Indian  labor  market  firther  reinforced  labor's  tendency  to confront  the elite. Besause  the
labor market  was segmented,  those  with  wagejobs in the formal  sector  became  "insiders",  a
labor  eite. Labor  mright  have  recognized  that employment  would  not gruw  as much  under  a
distributional  as under  a non-distributional  policy  regime. However,  they  were  more.
concerned  with  increases  in  their  own  wages  than  with employment  opportunities  for
outsiders. For  all these  reasons,  Indian  labor  perceived  confrontation  to be a better strategy
for  themselves  even  if  the  elie chose  to be non-distributional.
With  the elite  choosing  distnrbtve policies  regardless  of labor's  choice,  and  labor
choosing  confrontation  regardless  of the choice  of the elite,  the situation  devolved  into  a
simple  "Prisoner's  Dilemma"  game. In the 1970s,  a more  pragmatic  elite  and  the leftist  labor
insiders  both  chose  to continue  with  the distibutional,  confrontational  policies  adopted
30  See Bates and Kmeger (1993)  and Turmham  (1993) for examples of such elite-labor  pacts.
3-L Since the Indian agincltural secor wms  relatv  stagnant until the mid-1970s.  the suppl  prce of labor
was low (see Ravallion  and Dutt, 1994). Increases  in urban wages, which segmented  the Indian labor market,
resulted fom  labor power  and not  from market  forces.
24decades  earlier. From  the perspective  of an objective  outsider,  the  cooperative,  encompassing
policies  would  have  proven  superior  in  the long  run. To  insiders  in  India,  they appeared  to be
inferior  and  therefore  were rejected.
Even  if labor  had not distrusted  the market,  and  had,  in fact,  preferred  to be non-
confrontational,  the result  may  not  have  been  differe if  the elite  had  chosen  to adopt non-
distributional  policies. Labor  would  still  have  had  to assess  the  probability  that  the Indian
elite  would  actually  sustain  these  policies.  This  is  where  credibiity  matters. Given  the history
of confrontational  skrmishes  with  capitalists,  and  in  the absence  of  strong  commitment
mechanisms  in India  in the 1970s,  labor  would  have  been  iclined to believe  that the elite
would  renege  on their  promise  of  non-distbutional  policies.  Therefore,  labor  would  have
chosen  confrontation,  and would  have  tried  to forge  (or  contine) a rent-sharing  pact with  the
elite.
e) Non-distribuion andNon-ConJionttion: Japan  in thepost-WarpenoL  After the
Setond  World  War,  the elite  in  Japan  faced  a serious  problem-that  of re-estblshing its
legitimacy  after  the country's  wartime  debacle,  and  rebuilding  the economy.  The  weakening
of the  miitary  by  American  occupation  forces  meant  that  the  emeging  elite  was  dominated  by
the bureaucracy  and  the Liberal  Democratic  Party. In this  relatively  uncertain  post-war
situation,  this  new  elite  group's  choice  of policy  was  thus  governed  by  the recognition  that it
needed  to gain  the confidence  ofthe populace-its  leadership  role  was  contestable.
The structure  of the labor  market  in  Japan  dunng  this  time  was  a key  detminant of
the strategy  adopted  by  labor. Since  labor  unions  were  enterpise-based,  there  were no
overarching  national  organizatons  that could  legitimately  claim  to represent  the views  of
Japanese  labor  as a whole. Unable  to easily  coordinate  its activities,  coordination  failure
predestined  labor  to be non-confrontational.
25Given  that labor  was  non-confrontational  and that  the elite's  rule  was  contestable,  the
elite  found  it more  attractive  to pursue  non-distnbutional  policies  that  expanded  the economic
pie. They  realized  that making  portions  of this ever-increasing  pie available  to the wider
population  would  ensure  that they  would  continue  to remain  in power. With  lower  political
nsk, their  discount  rate  was  reduced,  and they  recognized  that the higher  rents  that could  be
made  in the short term,  using  distributional  policies,  were outweighed  by the smaller  per
period  rents  that would  flow  continuously  over the long  term  with  non-distnbutional
poliCies. 32
The success  of the non-distributional  policies  in Japan  reinforced  labor's  disposition  to
remain  non-confrontational  This  willingness  was enhanced  by the elite  through  a
commitment  to continually  ensure  that  labor's  wages  were closely  tied to increases  in
productivit (Johnson  1982). As a reslt, the real earnings  of Japanese  workers  grew
Steadily.  33
D) Non-dbution  and  enforced  non  confrontaton: Mlaysia and  Singapore  in the
1950s  and 1960s. The  elite  in  Malaysia  and Singapore  faced  a significant  communist  threat -
-that is, their  power  was contestable.  Therefore,  they  saw  that it was  in their  interest  to
adopt  a principle  of shared  growth  - and  to ensure  that all groups,  not  just themselves  and
wage  labor,  benefited  from  growth. Whge  disrutional  policies  might  yield  high  short-run
rents,  they  realzed  this could  only  be at the cost of the poor. 34 Their  ideological  priors  did
not precommit  them,  they  saw  that  market-friendly  policies  would  yield  a more  labor-
dem  ding  growth  path and  hence  would  improve  the economic  prospects  for  the poor.
32  One  of  the  most  important  conuftri  s to  the  success  of  the  non-distributional  policy  in Japan  vas the
successful  land  reform.  This  was  party  undertake  because  of  calls  for 'democaaaton'  by  the middle  class,
and executed  under prsse  from  the American  occupying  forces  (Hayanmi  1991).
33 Groith in real eanings for  Japanese  workers  averaged  about  two-and-aalf percnt a year  even  during
1970-90  (World  Bank 1993a).  This compares  favorably  with  wage  growth  oer the samc  period  in some  of  the
more  rapidly  growing  economies  such  as Malaysia  and Thailand  (see  Table 1).
34  See,  for exampl, WorldBank  (1993a),  pp. 157-89.
25In our framework,  the policy  choice  of  the elite  would  be determined  by  their
assessment  of payoffs,  given  each  of labors  two  possible  strategies.  If labor  chose  to be non-
confrontational,  non-distributional  policies  would  dominate  for  the elite  in  Malaysia  and
Singapore.  In  these  countries,  unlike  in  India,  the elite  did  not have  ideological  objections  to
export  orientation.  On  the contary,  they  appeared  to believe  that an export-oriented  strategy
offered  the potential  for high  and sustained  returns  for  all segments  of sociey. But  what  if
labor  chose  to be confrontational?  Contestability  implied  that improving  the  welfare  of the
poor  was  important  to ensure  the elite's  own  continued  tenure. Thus,  forming  an alliance  with
confrontational  labor  that  yielded  high  returns  to both  groups  at the expense  of the  poor  was
not a desirable  option. Non-disbutional policies  appeared  to be the only  feasible  choice.
The  problem  was resolved  by  labor's  evaluation  of possible  payoffs  under  the elite's
two strategies.  Labor  in both  Maaysia  and  Smgapore  had  ideologicaly  leftist  underp  s.
As far  back  as  the 1940s,  Malaya's  trade  unions  were  used  by  the Malayan  Communist  Party,
which  had  been  declared  illegaL  to build  support  for  itself.  Confrontational  tactics,  which
sometimes  even  went  as far as  physical  attak  agamst  employers  in  plantions and  mines,
were  used. 35 The  niling  elite  in Singapore  also  fced a threat  from  the leftist  union
movement,  which  was supported  by the  Bansa Sodialis  or Socialist  Party,  during  the
country's  formative  years  in the late 1950s  and  early  1960s. 36
Thus,  labor  had an inherently  cofontational ideological  bias. The  structure  of the
labor  market  did  nothing  to offset  this bias. There  was  very  lie  chance  of  non-confrontation
being  achieved  through  coordination  failue among  the labor  groups,  since  the most  vocal
unions  all  seemed  to adopt  a contational  stance.  Moreover,  unions  were  almost  all
comprised  of insiders,  who did  not seem  to care  that  conrontational  policies  might  lead  to
lower  employment  growth. Thus,  their  evaluation  of  payoffs  was  that confrontation  was
preferable,  irrespective  of the elite's  choice  of policies.
35  Arudsofth  and  Littler(1993),  pp. 111-113.
36  Leggett  (1993),  pp. 224-25.
27The  equilibrium  here  would  have  bad labor  being  confrontational  and agitating  for
higher  rents even  within  a non-distributional,  market-friendly,  export-oriented  economy
fostered  by the elite. This  would  have  been  an intrinsicaly  unstable  equilibrium,  since  nigher
than market  wages  in an open  economy  are not sustainable.  With  exports  beconing
uncompetitive,  the payoffs  to both  the elite  and  labor  would  have  decreased. For the non-
distrbutional  elites  in Malaysia  and Singapore,  who  foresaw  that labor  would  choose
confrontation,  the only  way  to preserve  their  own  payoff  was  to impose  non-confrontation  on
labor,  repressing  their  abgity  to agitate  for greater  rents. In Malaysia  and Singapore,  non-
distrbutional  elite  policies  were eventually  paired  with  non-confrontational  labor,  but not
necessarily  because  that was labor's  preferred  choice.
7  The  Role of Creibliy:  Malaia  and Singapore  since  fhe 1970s The enforced  non-
confrontation  of labor  unions  descrbed  above  was a response  by the elite  to ideological  labor.
When  labor  is more  pragmatic,  more  voluntary  forms  of  non-confrontation  are feasible,
although  this resut is dependent  on the credibility  of  the elite. Labor-elite  interacfions  in
today's  Malaysia  and Singapore  illustrate  this equibrium
In the 1970s,  the assessment  by labor  in  these  countries  of the best strategy  to follow
differed  from  that of their  more  ideological  counterparts  in earlier  years.  Pragmatic  labor  saw
that it would  benefit  then to be non-confrontationaL  if the elite  continued  to follow  non-
distribuional  policies.  On the other  hand,  confronzation  would  still  be best if  the elite  chose
distnrbutional  policies.  Thus,  if labor  had no idea  of what  the Malaysian  elite  would  do, it
would  try to guess  their motives,  assigning  a probability  to each  of the elite's choices.
It is here  that the credibility  of the Malaysian  elite  can  be considered  to have  played  a
key role  - since  it was important  for labor  to know  that the elite  would  not attempt  to switch
to a more distnbutional  set of policies  once  their compliance  was assured  Labor was willing
to ascnbe  a high  probability  to the elite  maintaining  a non-rent-sharing,  market-oriented
regime. The key  commitment  mechanism  backing  up the elite's  stance  was  the 1971  New
28Economic  Policy  (NEP),  which  mandated  the eradication  of poverty  among  the bumiputeras,
ethnic  Malays  who comprised  most  of the poor. 37 Labor  saw  this  as a credible  sign  that  the
elite  intended  to remain  non-distnbutional.
A roughly  similar  situation  characterized  elite-labor  interactions  in Singapore.  The
elite,  after  imposing  cooperation  on labor,  established  export-oriented  economic  policies
based  on attating  mulinational  corporations.  But they  recognized  that labor  could  not be
kept non-confrontational  forever  unless  it established  a means  of ensuring  that labor  felt  that
voluntarily  foregoing  confrontation  was  in its  interest  (Campos  and  Root, 1994).
To achieve  this,  the elite  in Singapore  created  the National  Wages  Council  (NWC),  a
consultative  committee  consisting  of  represenatives  from  the government,  labor,  and  busiess
that  deliberated  on employment  policies.  One  of its principal  fimctions  was  to ascertain  that
wage  increases  were  tied  to productivity  increases.  Labor  was  thus  assured  that everyone
would  share  in  the long-term  benefits  of  growth. The  NWC  was  credible  and  thus  an
effective  commitment  mechanism  because  it was  givn defacto authority  over  employment
policies-all  matters  pertaining  to employment  had  to be discussed  in the council  and no
policies  would  be adopted  unless  recommended  by the counciL  Thus  labor  was  wiEng  to
coinualy  accept  the pmi  that  the elite  was non-distributional.  In turn,  the elite  could
feel  confident  of remaining  in power  for a long  time  without  having  to fice any  serious
chalenges. This  lowered  the elite's  discount  rate and made  them  wiling  to continue  with  non-
distributional  policies.
The choice  of non-confrontation  by labor  in Malaysia  and Singapore  was  not a
foregone  conclusion.  The  choice  was  made  warily,  as a result  of labores  belief  in the credibility
of the elite's  commitment  to non-distributional  policies.  Thus,  policies  that reinforced  this
37 Malaysia  had  consistentl  followed  a market  oriented  trade  and  industial  policy  since  independence.
Moreover,  agnculural  polices,  such  as lower  taxation  and rumal  electrification,  bad ensured  that the
agrimltural  sector  -as groving.  raising  fte supply  price  of  labor. The  pnlicies  workedawell  - for  example,
between  1973  and 1987,  the  number  of  poor  Maaysians  vwas  halved  (World  Bank  1993a,  p. 33).
29belief,  such  as commitment  mechanisms  like  the NEP  and  NVC, contributed  to maintaining
this  equilibrium.
5. IMPEDIMENTS  TO LABOR  MARKET  REFORM
Since  it is  clear  that the combination  of non-confrontational  labor  and encompassing
policies  yields  outcomes  superior  to the alternative,  why  dont labor  and the ruling  elite  in
economies  like  India  simply  alter  their  stance  and  become  non-confrontational  and  non-
distributional?  Why  doesn't  Indian  labor  choose  non-confrontation,  given  that the present
discounted  value  of  reuns  to 4his  choice  would  most  likely  vastly  exceed  the returns  to the
alternative?
The  analysis  above  suggests  three  reasons  for  the  failure  to imitiate  labor  reform. 38
One  important  reason  is labor's  fear  that  the elite  would  not keep  their  part of the bargain.
They  foresee  ending  up with  the low  returns  that result  from  being  non-confrontational  in a
distnbutional  environment,  and  therefore  prefer  the slightly  higher  returns  they can  get from
being  confrontationaL  For the elite,  too, a lack  of  trust  in labor's  promise  to be non-
confrontational  may  induce  caution  regarding  the adoption  of non-distributional  policies  -
since  the combination  of confrontational  labor  and  non-distnbutional  policies  would  be likely
to yield  lower  retuns to the elite  than  the distbutional,  rent-shaing  regime  with  which  they
have  grown  comfortable.
Second,  the fear  ofjob loss  is obviously  another  cause  of labor  resistance.  The
immediate  adjustment  to a more  market-oriented  policy  regime  usually  involves  loss ofjobs.
Some  dinsider"  workers  would  thus  lose  their  jobs, and  arguably,  the most  affected  will  be the
least  able  - those  who  have  theirjobs  due  to political  influence.  They  are the workers  who
are likely  to have  the most  difficulty  finding  altemative  employment,  especially  if  the private
sector  can  afford  to be selective  or is not dynamic  with  respect  to job growth. Political
38  This  question  is  analyzed  in greater  detail  in Baneiji,  Campos  and  Sabot  (fonhcoming,  b).
30appointees  may  also  have  the  greatest  ability  to persuade  the leadership  to maintain  the status
quo.
Third  and more  generally,  there  is  the issue  of hysteresis.  Labor  insiders  are likely  to
fear  losing  their  rents. The  value  placed  by vested  interests  on the erosion  of their  wages  may
exceed  the value  they  place  on their  perceived  gains  from  reform. They  may  expect  the
former  to be larger  than  the latter  - that is,  they  may  have  a kinked  utility  function  or a high
discount rate.39 In this case, confrontation  would continue  to be the dominant  strategy
despite  the expectation  that in the long  run  labor  would  benefit  from refonn. Note that for
Malaysian  or Indian  labor  in the 1950s,  this  tradeoff  between  short-run  costs and  long  term
gains  did not exst - since  they  did  not  have  any  entrenched  and assured  retuns. In the short
run, the losers  know  who they  are,  and  resist  the erosion  of  their rents,  while  the wimnners,
more diffiuse,  cannot  explicitly  promise  compensation  to the losers  from the fiature  gains  to all.
There are however,  solutions  to these  problems,  especially  if labor and  the elite
understand  the potentially  large  benefits  that would  be enjoyed  by them if they  chose  a more
non-onfrontational  stance  in a non-distrbutional  policy  envronment The credihbiity  of the
elite's  position  (and  that of labor)  becomes  important Confrontation  in the past  is a source  of
mistrut in the present,  as Indian  labor  and  the elite  may  both doubt the strength  of  the
commitment  to the new  strategy  of the other  group. A history  of administative  detrmination
of labor  market  outcomes  fiuther  complicates  matters,  as neither  party have  had experience  in
interpreting  the signals  generated  by  the labor  market  and  therefore  would  have  difficulty
monitoring  the success  of the new  strategy.  The  creation  of appropriate  commitment
mechanisms,  like  the NEP  in  Malaysia  and  the NWC  in Singapore,  thus become  inportant  as a
means  of assuring  the credibility  of  both  labor  and  the elite.
6.  CONCLUSIONS
3  9 Work  by Knetsch  (1989)  and Kahnesan  and  Tversky  (1979.  1984)  find that individuals  value  the  loss  of a
given  amount  of income  more  than  thev  malue  the Oin of an equivalent  amount.
31Domestic  labor  market  outcomes  influence  the direction  and  magnitude  of  the flow  of
international  migration.  When  wages  are low  and  jobs  are scarce,  there  is  an incentive  for
workers  to migrate  to environments  where  jobs are available  at hieher  wages. As  labor
demand  grows,  however,  a labor-eporting  country  may  become  a net labor  importer. Such  a
"migration  tranzsition,"  which  is already  much  in evidence  in  the countries  of East and South-
East  Asia,  and  has  begun  for  sidled  workers  in India,  is analogous  to the demographic
transition.  The  political  economy  process  descnbed  here  affects  both  the level  and growth  of
wages  and fonnal  sector  employment.  Therefore,  it is  important  for policymakers  concerned
about  migration  to high-income  countries  to take  into  account
An  efficient,  flemible  and responsive  labor  market  contnbutes  to the growth  process
through  the creation  of an appropriate  economic  enviomnent. n this  respect,  labor  market
policy  is like  macroeconomic  and  trade  policy.  In contrast  to the accumulation  of physical  and
hLuman  capital  and  technical  progress,  a wel-fimctioning  labor  market  is not, in itself a source
of economic  growth.  Yet,  labor  market  pathologies,  like  macroeconomic  mismanagement,  can
be extremely  costly,  severely  constainig growth  of output  and employment,  and  increasing
inequality.  Likewise,  faiure  to adequately  address  the labor  market  dimension  of policy
refomn  can  result  in  the failure  of other  dimensions  of reforn.
Good  labor  market  performance  feeds  on itself,  enhancing  the credhbility  of  both labor
and  the elite. Likewise,  poor  labor  market  perrmance ca  also  be self-reinforcin&  Attempts
at labor market reform  are therefore likely to be hampered  by the lack of credibility  of both
labor  and  the elite. The  payoff  to reform  can  be high  for  both  groups;  the challenge  is to find
mechanisms  whereby  the credibility  of both  groups  can  be bolstered.
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Korea.  Rep.  of  8.19  6.58  15.31  8.81 NI4,-NCI.  Indonesia  5.I5  8.5  14.08  5.44 (N  un-isiriliutional  Malayala  2.21  8.23  10.61  4.41 Elite, Naon  Singapore  4.43  5.37  10.04  6.503 Cntfronltalonal  Jhang  Kong  5.65  1.66  7.40  6.203 Labor)  7haliand  3.00  S.  13  8.28  4.43 Chile  4.89  1.02  5.96_  1.88
Philippines  0.44  4.06  4.52  1.06
India  2.19  2.00  4.23  2.19
Kenya  -1.87  5.56  3.58  0.73 IDE-CL  Trinidad&  Tobago  2.10  0.59  2.70  1.69 (DIsIributionaI  Colombia  0.62  1.85  2.48  2.12 Elite,  Zambla  .0.91  1.91  1.04  S5.00 Conraottalanal  Jamnaca  -1.05  1.79  0.72  -0.93 Labor)  Mexico  -1.05  1.09  0.03  1.57 Pern  -3.251  2.591  -0.741  -1.57
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N.'llex /  1970-19898,  2 1970-1987;  3 1965-90,  GrOss  National  Product  pef capita
Suurces:  Calculated  fmrm  Waold  Bank  I3ESD  data,  Warld  Bank  (1992)Table 2: Trade Orientation  in East Asia
Counties  TradeIGDP,  1970-92
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